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As all the books say, the function of technical assist-
ance is to fill a resource gap, by providing people with
particular skills - either to deal with ctd hoc. problems, or
to meet a continuing need which will eventually be filled
by local people. But to think of technical assistance
people in this abstract way as a "resource" can be mis-
leading. They are not a more or less uniform resource like
capital aid (even tied capital aid - an american truck is&t
all that different from a British truck or a German truck)
or food aid. Technical assistance experts are people -
that is, individuals with their own national and social
backgrounds, their own prejudices, their own career structures,
and their own attitudes to the jobs they are asked to do.
Some of these individual characteristics may be helpful;
others may be damaging, but some or all of them will conflict
with the optimum use of the technical assistance expert
as a "resource".
Some of these drawbacks are obvious and well known.
There is, however, one potential source of conflict which
has, I believe, been insufficiently considered. This
is the conflict between the time-scale of the visiting expert
and the time-scale of the problems with which he is supposed
to deal. Most technical assistance experts are appointed
for periods up to two years. UN appointments are normally
for one year in the first instance, but are frequently
renewed. But whatever the period, the expert normally
has a discrete time horizon at the end of which his concern
with the particular country will end. He will normally
accept that the "problem" (whatever this might be) will
not go away merely because he does, but he must still be
influenced in various ways by this presence of a finite
time horizon.
The first (and in many administrations the most frequent)
conflict will be between the desire of the expert to "get
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something done" during the period of his appointment, and
local politicians and administrators who have lived with
the problems for many years and who expect to continue to
live with them for many more years. Sometimes this may
reflect realism; sometimes mere inertia. In either event,
there will be a conflict between the time-scale of the expert
and that of the administration. In extreme cases, I have
seen this lead experts to near-paranoiac states of mind.
In a situation of this kind it is useless to apportion blame.
The administration may be at fault for lacking a sense of
urgency; the expert may be at fault for failure to see
his own role in the longer-term context of the
history. But wherever the fault lies, the effectiveness
of the expert as a resource will be reduced.
The type of advice given by the expert will be influenced
by this time horizon. He may have an unconscious bias
in favour of projects with a short - or at any rate an easily
foreseeable - pay-off, at the expense of longer-term policies
and programmes. This seems to be particularly the case
with visiting expert missions, who may feel impelled to
suggest some self-contained projects with a clearly defined
time-scale merely in order to justify their own existence.
This particular prejudice may, however, be welcomed by govern-
ments who find it easier to think of development in terms
of specific projects (which do not involve the more fundamental
and difficult policy and organisational changes which are
really needed), and are therefore happy to cooperate with
the visiting expert who suggests such an approach.
There is one particular field where the time horizon
of the visiting expert may be of substantial importance.
Much of the argument about public corporations in developing
countries has tended to be carried on at an ideological
level - as a question of principle. But one central issue
is the nature and attitudes of the managers of these corpor-
ations. Many such corporations are managed by expatriates
brought in under technical assistance arrangements. Such
people, if they are any good, are usually in mid-career in
other occupations. They may be concerned to make a success
of the operation to which they are assigned, but the criteria
by which they judge "success" will be overwhelmingly influenced
by their time horizon.
Two types of public corporation are of central importance
in this context - development corporations (charged with
a general responsibility for attracting or promoting investment)
and development banks. We are all familiar now with the
fact that managers of large modern corporations may be
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concerned more with growth than with profitability. Similar-
ly the development corporation manager with a two-year
contract may consider that his success will be judged more
by the amount of investment he promotes or the number of
enterprises he gets off the ground than with quality of
the investment, the benefits which it produces for the
local economy, or the fate of the enterprises in five years
time. Such managers may indeed resent any suggestion that
their investment proposals should be subject to some overriding
criterion of national benefit, and may quite seriously regard
suggestions of this kind as sabotage of the development
effort.
Similarly the "success" of a development bank - at
least in the short run - may be judged on the basis of the
level of loans made and the proportion of such loans which
are repaid. But if a development bank wishes to expand
its business in the short run, it will usually find that
the easiest path is to lend to the modern and successful
sectors of the economy. The bank may therefore help to accent-
uate the dualism of the economy. So in a sugar economy
the bank will mostly lend to the sugar industry; in a mineral
economy to the mining industry. Everywhere banks will
support the established rather than the struggling sectors
of the economy. This tendency may also be confirmed if
the manager is unduly influenced by traditional "banking"
views about security, but even without such prejudices
the time horizon within which the manager is working will
push him towards the kind of business which promises the
most rapid and risk-free expansion.
There is no simple solution to this problem of limited
time horizons, but two possible approaches might be con-
sidered.
First, there is the possibility that technical assis-
tance appointments should be for longer periods. This
creates obvious difficulties. A foreign expert who works
in a country for a long time (as do many people working
under OSAS arrangements) may become too closely involved
in the working of the administration. He may become part
of a byzantine struggle for power and influence, or may
in other ways lose whatever independence he had. He may,
consciously or unconsciously, block the training and promotion
of local personnel who might take his job. Moreover,
he may come to accept the time scale of the host government,
even where this is clearly inappropriate to the needs of
the country. To do so will certainly lessen conflict, but
may not increase effectiveness.
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Secondly, there may be a role for better training
and briefing of technical assistance experts. It must
not be assumed that, merely because the expert knows all
about his own subject, he will necessarily be effective
in his job. If experts are made more aware of the longer
term problems of the countries in which they are to operate,
there is some possibility that they will see their own limited
operation in a broader context, and will be less influenced
by their own narrow time horizons. The difficulty is who
is to do the briefing. Ideally it should be the host govern-
ment, but they may be unaware of the problem, and may indeed
have little idea of the role they expect the expert to play.
Universities or development institutes in host countries
might also help, but their services will not be used unless
there is a wider awareness of the nature of the problem.
We are faced with a situation somewhat akin to that of
university teachers. It is assumed that somebody who knows
his subject is capable of teaching it, and that no special
training is needed in the art of teaching - this against all
experience of anybody who has had to sit through university
lectures. But the problem cannot be tackled until there is
a general awareness of it.
Lastly, it is possible that some countries have only
a very limited absorptive capacity for technical assistance
merely because the gap between the time horizon of the expert
and that of the local administration is impossibly wide.
This may well be one of the insoluble problems in develop-
ment aid.
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